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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
GENOCIDE CONVENTION
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS*
THE CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE was adopted on December 9, 1948,' and entered into
force on January 11, 1951 2 It defines the crime of genocide and sets out
various norms governing its punishment, as well as establishing the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the matter of disputes
about its interpretation and application. Its obligations essentially concern
issues of criminal liability for the crime. Nevertheless, in the recent case
between Bosnia and Serbia, the International Court held that it could make
a finding that a State had either committed genocide or failed to prevent it.3
This might, as a result, lead to a finding that some form of just
compensation would be due, although in the specifics of that case the Court
declined to make such a finding.
The Genocide Convention was drafted by the United Nations General
Assembly pursuant to Resolution 96(I), which was adopted two years
earlier on December 11, 1946. Resolution 96(1) affirmed "that genocide is a
crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for
the commission of which principals and accomplices - whether private
individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is
committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds - are
punishable."4 Thus, the starting point for the debate about the existence of
genocide in positive international law occurs somewhat before the adoption
of the Genocide Convention.
* OC, MRIA, Professor of Human Rights Law, National University of Ireland, Galway and
Director, Irish Centre for Human Rights; Global Legal Scholar, University of Warwick School of
Law.
1. G.A. Res. 260 (III) U.N. Docs. A (Dec. 9, 1948).
2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
3. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 20 (Feb. 26).
4. G.A. Res. 96 (1) U.N. Doc. A/310 (Dec. 11, 1946).
Retroactive Application of the Genocide Convention
The issue of the temporal operation of the Convention has arisen in
debates about the atrocities perpetrated upon the Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire, primarily during 1915. For example, the recent study by Geoffrey
Robertson, and in particular the documents that he obtained from the British
Foreign and Commonwealth Office pursuant to an access to information
request, reveal British diplomats invoking the supposed non-retroactive
application of the Convention as a rationale for failing to take a position on
the description of the events. A draft answer prepared by bureaucrats in the
Foreign Office said that "additionally, the government's legal advisors have
said that the 1948 UN Convention on genocide, which is in any event not
retrospective in application, was drafted in response to the holocaust and
whilst the term can be applied to tragedies that occurred subsequent to the
holocaust, such as Rwanda, it cannot be applied retrospectively." 5 The issue
returned on June 7, 2006, when government spokesman Geoff Hoon replied
to a parliamentary inquiry:
The fact is that the legal offence of genocide had not been named or
defined at the time that the actual atrocities were committed. The
UN Convention on Genocide came into force in 1948 so it was not
possible at the time of the events that we are considering legally to
label the massacres as genocide within the terms of the convention.
I recognize that it is perfectly possible intellectually to try to apply
the definitions of genocide from the convention to appalling
tragedies that occurred in this case some 30 years before. The
common practice in law is not to apply such judgment
retrospectively...6
The British government returned to the point in 2007, in a memorandum
that said "it is not common practice in law to apply judgments
retrospectively."7
This paper attempts to address two questions: (1) Does the Genocide
Convention apply to acts or events prior to its entry into force? (2) Did the
crime of genocide exist under international law prior to January 11, 1951 ?
5. Parliamentary Question Background Document relating to a written question from Lord
Buffen tabled on 23 January 2001 - Draft response for Baroness Scotland, cited in GEOFFREY
ROBERTSON, WAS THERE AN ARMENIAN GENOCIDE? 65 (2009).
6. Hansard, 7 June 2006, Col. 136WH.
7. HMG's position on the Armenian Genocide Claims, Memorandum from the Russia,
South Caucasus and Central Asia Directorate, FCO to Mr Murphy, (July 2, 2007), cited in
ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 35.
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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION
Several distinguished authorities have addressed the issue of retroactive
application of the Genocide Convention in recent years. In 2003, the
International Center for Transitional Justice, a prestigious non-
governmental organization, based in New York City, issued an opinion on
this subject, which it said was prepared by "independent legal counsel." The
opinion begins by noting that international law generally prohibits the
retroactive application of treaties. It refers to Article 28 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act
or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist
before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to
that party.8
The Vienna Convention did not itself enter into force until 1980, suggesting
its own problem of retroactivity. However, as the opinion notes, it is widely
agreed that the Vienna Convention provision merely codifies a norm that
has been well-established in customary international law, and one that is
supported by decisions of international treaties.9 The opinion also notes that
there is no clause in the Genocide Convention suggesting the intent of the
parties to give it retroactive effect, nor is there any support for this in the
preparatory work of the Convention. According to the opinion:
The travaux pr~paratoires of the Convention support the
contention that the negotiators understood that they were accepting
prospective, not retrospective, obligations on behalf of the States
they represented, including the 'prevention of future crimes'. One
delegate described the purpose of the Convention as expressing 'the
peoples' desire to punish all those who, in the future, might be
tempted to repeat the appalling crimes that had been committed'. 0
The opinion concludes: "The Genocide Convention does not give rise to
individual criminal or state responsibility for events which occurred during
the early twentieth century or at any time prior to January 12, 1951."'" More
recently, Geoffrey Robertson has reached a similar conclusion. 2
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 28, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
9. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. U.K), 1924 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A.) No.
2. Preliminary Objections, Ambatielos Case (Greece v. U.K.), 1952 I.C.J. 40 (July 1).
10. International Center for Transitional Justice [ICTJ], Analysis on Applicability of UN
Convention on Genocides pre-1951 at 4 (Feb. 4 2003).
II. Id.
12. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 14.
Retroactive Application of the Genocide Convention
Alfred de Zayas is sometimes cited as a proponent of the view that the
Genocide Convention applies retroactively. In fact, on close scrutiny of his
writing, this does not appear to be the case. 3 Rather, de Zayas argues that
the crime of genocide existed prior to the entry into force of the Genocide
Convention. His views are not really very different from those of the
International Center for Transitional Justice and Geoffrey Robertson.
Nevertheless, it is probably imprecise to suggest that the Convention is
without legal consequences with respect to events prior to its January 11,
1951, ratificication. In that sense it might be said to have a retroactive or
retrospective effect. There are at least two dimensions to this issue. First,
the Genocide Convention is a widely ratified, multilateral treaty that in at
least some respects is acknowledged to either confirm, codify, or to declare,
the norms and principles of customary international law. In its advisory
opinion on reservations to the Genocide Convention, issued in 1951, the
International Court of Justice wrote that:
The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the
United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as 'a crime under
international law' involving a denial of the right of existence of
entire human groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of
mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is
contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United
Nations. The first consequence arising from this conception is that
the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without
any conventional obligation."
Obviously, if only a few months after the entry into force of the
Convention, the International Court of Justice considered that "the
principles underlying the Convention" were binding on States, regardless of
whether they had ratified the Convention, there is an evident implication
that these principles applied in the past, that is, before the entry into force
and even before the adoption of the Convention.
Reference is also often made to the preamble of the Convention, which
states that at "all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on
humanity."' 5 Obviously, these words are meant to apply to events prior to
January 11, 1951. The preamble to a treaty is deemed to be part of its
context for the purposes of interpretation of the treaty, according to Article
13. Alfred de Zayas, The Genocide Against the Armenians 1915-1923 and the Relevance of
the 1948 Genocide Convention, (2004), http://alfreddezayas.com/Lawhistory/armlegopi.shtml.
14. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 23 (May 28, 1951).
15. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, preamble, Jan.
12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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31(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.'6 As Jann Kleffner
has pointed out, nothing in the law of treaties suggests that provisions of a
preamble have an inferior legal force to other provisions or no legal force
whatsoever. 7 According to Charles Rousseau, "[o]n a parfois considr le
prrambule des trait~s comme dour d'une force obligatoire inf~ieure A celle
du dispositive. Mais c'est IlA une opinion isolre."1
Paragraph 2 of the preamble of the Convention, read along with the
judgment of the International Court of Justice, should be enough to dispose
of the suggestion that the term "genocide" cannot apply to events prior to
entry into force of the Convention. The Preamble to the Convention fulfils
an essentially declaratory function, although probably one that is perhaps
superfluous given General Assembly Resolution 96(). 9 There is also some
State practice to confirm this perspective on the crime of genocide
historically. In submissions to the International Court of Justice in 1951, the
United States said:
The practice of genocide has occurred throughout human history.
The Roman persecution of the Christians, the Turkish massacres of
Armenians, the extermination of millions of Jews and Poles by the
Nazis arc outstanding examples of the crime of genocide. This was
the background when the General Assembly of the United Nations
considered the problem of genocide.2°
Nevertheless, paragraph 2 refers to "genocide" rather than to "the crime of
genocide."'" This may have been inadvertent, although it might suggest a
distinction, to which this paper will return shortly. Although "genocide"
may have inflicted great losses on humanity at "all periods of human
history," it does not necessarily follow that the crime of genocide was
punishable under international law at all times.
Second, it might be contended that the Genocide Convention is
applicable to acts that took place prior to its ratification, to the extent that
there is an ongoing or prospective procedural obligation to investigate and
punish acts of genocide. The procedural obligations in the Genocide
Convention are framed rather vaguely, at least by comparison with more
modem treaties governing international crimes and human rights abuses.
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), May 23, 1979, 1155 UNTS 331.
17. Jann K. Kleffner, Auto-referrals and the Complementary Nature of the ICC, in THE
EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 41, 45 & n. 18 (Carsten Stahn &
Goran Sluiter eds., 2009).
18. CHARLES ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, I, INTRODUCTIONS ET SOURCES
87 (2nd ed. 1970).
19. G.A. Res. 96(), U.N. Doc. A/310 (Dec. 11, 1946).
20. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 195 1I.C.J. 25 (May 28, 1951).
21. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. H1, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
Retroactive Application of the Genocide Convention
Despite inadequacies in the text, a purposive reading of the Convention
supports the existence of a positive obligation to investigate and prosecute
crimes of genocide. Could this include genocide committed prior to January
11, 1951? State practice probably confirms such an interpretation of the
Convention. A large number of States have incorporated the crime of
genocide within their own national legislation, often giving their legislation
retroactive effect. Yet it does not seem to be State practice to limit this
retroactive effect to events subsequent to entry into force of the Convention.
For example, Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act,
adopted in 2000, gives national courts jurisdiction over genocide committed
in the past, without any temporal limitation.22 Although prosecutions for
genocide by national jurisdictions are rare, even with respect to
contemporary events, there is some evidence of proceedings for the crime
of genocide directed at acts perpetrated prior to entry into force of the
Convention. The Eichmann trial, held in Israel in the early 1960s, is the
great example here.23
This contention might be said to be bolstered by a recent decision of the
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. In Varnava et al
v. Turkey, the European Court concluded that Turkey was under an
obligation to investigate and punish with respect to disappeared persons,
even when the disappearance itself took place prior to the acceptance by
Turkey of the jurisdiction of the Court.24 It is probably unwise, however, to
extrapolate the holding in Varnava too much, given that it dealt specifically
with cases of enforced disappearance. It seems improbable that the
European Court would conclude in a similar vein with respect to a murder
or a rape that occurred prior to recognition of its jurisdiction by a State
party. Nevertheless, Varnava represents a significant evolution in the case
law of the Court, and the possibility that this line of reasoning might go
even further in the future can certainly not be excluded.
As has already been mentioned, writers on the subject have generally
dismissed the hypothesis that the Convention could apply in a robust sense
to events prior to its entry into force. Reliance is placed upon Article 28 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, there is nothing in
the Convention to suggest that it does not apply retroactively either.
Moreover, the general rule for treaties dealing with international criminal
liability for atrocity crimes actually seems to favor retrospective
application. At the time the Genocide Convention was adopted, in
December 1948, there were three examples of international treaties defining
atrocity crimes, and each of them had an implicit retrospective application.
22. Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 24, s. 6 (Can.).
23. CrimA 40/61 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, [1961] IsrSC 36 277.
24. Varnava et al v. Turkey, [2008] Eur. Ct. H.R. 16064/90. See also, Silih v. Slovenia,
[2009] Eur. Ct. H.R. 71463/01 156-58.
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The first is the Treaty of Versailles, adopted in 1919, which contemplated
the prosecution of the German emperor "for a supreme offence against
international morality and the sanctity of treaties." 5 Nothing explicitly
referred to a retroactive application, but this was obviously the intent of the
parties. The second is the Treaty of S~vres, which envisaged prosecution of
"the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on
territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on the 1st August,
1914 . 126 Although the Treaty of Svres did not enter into force, it
nevertheless provides further authority for the proposition that treaty
practice in the area of international criminal law regarding atrocity crimes is
to provide for retroactive effect. Finally, the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal also provides for retroactive prosecution of crimes against
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.27 Finally, practice
subsequent to adoption of the Genocide Convention suggests that when an
international criminal law treaty is to apply only prospectively, there will be
explicit provision to this effect. The best example here is the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court. Not one but two distinct provisions of
the Statute,28 and one provision in the ancillary Elements of Crimes,29
ensure that it has no retroactive effect. In other words, with respect to this
specialized area of international law, the exception would seem to be the
rule; that is, treaties are retroactive absent some evidence of a clear
intention to the contrary. Accordingly, the argument that the Convention
applies retroactively should not be so cavalierly dismissed. There is at least
an arguable case for retroactive application, based upon treaty practice.
TEMPORAL SCOPE OF THE "CRIME OF GENOCIDE"
Whether or not a retrospective scope is given to the Genocide
Convention, there is the quite separate matter of the punishability of the
crime of genocide under general international law or customary
international law prior to January 11, 1951. Indeed, even if a retrospective
effect to the Convention is acknowledged, the temporal scope of this still
remains to be determined to the extent that the retroactive effect is limited
25. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany art. 227, Jun 28,
1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 482.
26. [1920] U.K.T.S. 11 art. 230.
27. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.
28. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 11, 24, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
29. International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/I/Add.2
article 7(1)(i) (2000). See also, WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 418-19 (2010).
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in time. Genocide, as a punishable crime, may have existed prior to the
adoption or entry into force of the Convention, but it does not follow that it
existed at all periods of human history.
The term "genocide" appears for the first time in any language in
November 1944, in the writings of Raphael Lemkin.30 It is sometimes said
that it was invented in 1943, because that was Lemkin's own claim, but he
did not use it in any publication until the following year. Lemkin explained
that the word "genocide" was "coined by the author to denote an old
practice in its modem developments."'"
There is no doubt that the term "genocide" was employed in official
and international legal contexts prior to the adoption of the Convention, and
even before General Assembly Resolution 96(I). Seven months after the
publication of Lemkin's book, the word "genocide" was used by the United
States delegation to the London Conference. Justice Robert Jackson, the
head of the delegation, made reference to "Genocide or destruction of racial
minorities and subjugated populations by such means and methods as (1)
underfeeding; (2) sterilization and castration; (3) depriving them of
clothing, shelter, fuel, sanitation, medical care; (4) deporting them for
forced labor; (5) working them in inhumane conditions. 32 The indictment
of the International Military Tribunal, issued in October 1945, charged Nazi
defendants with "deliberate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination
of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain
occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of
people, and national, racial or religious groups, particularly Jews, Poles, and
Gypsies."33 The term was also used on several occasions by prosecutors
during the trial itself.3
4
On December 11, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
Resolution 96(I) on the subject of genocide:
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual
human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the
conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the
form of cultural and other contributions represented by these human
groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of
30. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE, LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS
OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS (1944).
31. Id. at 79.
32. Robert H. Jackson, Planning Memorandum Distributed to Delegations at Beginning of
London Conference, June 1945, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 68 (1945),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jackl1 .asp.
33. France v. G~ering, 13 I.L.R. 203, 45-6 (Int'l Military Trib. 1948).
34. Id. See also, 19 I.M.T. 497, 509, 531 (1948).
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the United Nations.
Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when
racial, religious, political and other groups have been destroyed,
entirely or in part.
The punishment of the crime of genocide is a matter of
international concern.
The General Assembly, therefore
Affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the
civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which
principals and accomplices-whether private individuals, public
officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on
religious, racial, political or any other grounds-are punishable;
Invites the Member States to enact the necessary legislation for the
prevention and punishment of the crime;
Recommends that international co-operation be organized between
States with a view to facilitating the speedy prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide, and, to this end,
Requests the Economic and Social Council to undertake the
necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a draft convention on
the crime of genocide to be submitted to the next regular session of
the General Assembly.35
This Resolution began the process that led to adoption of the Convention in
1948. Was the resolution intended to be declaratory of pre-existing
international law, or is it better described as belonging to the progressive
development of international law? The preparatory work of the Resolution
is ambiguous in this respect. On the one hand, the Preamble states: "Many
instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred." Perhaps this idea is
the ancestor of paragraph 2 of the Convention's Preamble. Innovative
criminal law legislation is always aimed at events that take place in the past
but previously have been unpunishable. Thus, the preambular idea that
genocide has occurred in the past is not necessarily authority for the view
35. G.A. Res. 96(I) UN Doc. A/310 (Dec. 11, 1946).
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that it was already an international crime.
The initial draft of Resolution 96(l), which was apparently authored by
Lemkin himself, said:
Whereas the punishment of the very serious crime of genocide
when committed in time of peace lies within the exclusive
territorial jurisdiction of the judiciary of every State concerned,
while crimes of a relatively lesser importance such as piracy, trade
in women, children, drugs, obscene publications are declared as
international crimes and have been made matters of international
concern.
36
The draft resolution was proposed by Cuba, India and Panama." These
three States, at any rate, do not seem to have thought that genocide was an
international crime in 1946. Yet in presenting the draft resolution to the
General Assembly, the Cuban representative said that "genocide was not a
new crime but had been committed on a vast scale during the last World
War."3 The Cuban delegate continued that "in deference to the rule of non
crimen sine lege... Cuba therefore asked that genocide be declared an
international crime."39 A Secretariat document explained:
The chief legal and constitutional obstacle to the punishment of
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity was,
in the past, the opinion held by some that the rules against
retroactive penal legislation, namely, the rules nullum crimen sine
lege and nulla poena sine lege, made the punishment
impermissible. It is one of the purposes of the draft convention to
dissipate any doubt as far as the crime of genocide is concerned.
40
This indicates a view of Resolution 96(l) as declaratory of existing
international law, by which genocide was already a crime. Its purpose was
not to create new law but rather to "dissipate any doubts" because of the
"opinion held by some."'4'
Moreover, Resolution 96() was soon taken as authority for the
existence of the crime of genocide prior to its adoption. In United States v.
Alsttter("The Justice Case"), an American Military Tribunal, delivering
judgment on December 3-4, 1947, spoke of "the crime of genocide"
36. UN Doc. A/BUR.50. For a summary of the history of the resolution, see Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, Historical Summary, U.N. Doc. E/621 (Nov. 2, 1946-Jan. 20, 1948)
37. Id.
38. Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Historical Summary, U.N. Doc. E/621 (Nov. 2,
1946-Jan. 20, 1948).
39. Id.
40. Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, List of Substantive Issues to be Discussed in the
Remaining Stages of the committee's Session, Memorandum submitted by the Secretariat, UN
Doc. E/ADC.25/11.
41. Id.
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committed during the Second World War.42 The Tribunal referred to
Resolution 96(1) as authority for the prosecution of Nazi atrocities.
Speaking to the charge that this might constitute retroactive prosecution, the
Tribunal said, "we find no injustice to persons tried for such crimes. They
are chargeable with knowledge that such acts were wrong and were
punishable when committed."43 The Tribunal concluded that Oswald
Rothaug, a Berlin prosecutor, "participated in the national program of racial
persecution... He participated in the crime of genocide."" Another Berlin
prosecutor, Ernst Lautz, was convicted of enforcing the law against Poles
and Jews which comprised "the established government plan for the
extermination of those races. He was an accessory to, and took a consenting
part in, the crime of genocide."45 Similarly, in United States v. Greifeldt
("The RuSHA Case"), in a judgment dated March 10, 1948, the American
Military Tribunal referred to the "crime of genocide."46 In both cases, the
convictions were registered pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10, 7
which did not use the word "genocide." However, it is clear that the
Tribunals considered genocide to be a form of crime against humanity.
Convictions for genocide were also recorded by courts in Poland in 1946
and 1947 with respect to Second World War atrocities.48
A more direct link with the Genocide Convention itself exists in the
Eichmann prosecution. The accused was charged pursuant to legislation
enacted to give effect to Israel's obligations under the Convention. The
Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law,49 which was adopted in
1950 and was explicitly intended to apply retroactively, contained a
provision entitled "crimes against the Jewish people."5 It was essentially
identical to the definition of genocide in Article 2 of the Convention except
that it did not apply generally to national, ethnic, racial and religious
groups, but only to "the Jewish people." Eichmann was convicted on this
basis for acts perpetrated between 1941 and 1945.1'
All of these prosecutions, by national courts applying legislative
provisions that they considered to be derived from international law,
42. United States v. Alstbtter, 3 T.W.C. 954, 963 (U.S. Military Trib. 1951).
43. Id. at 983.
44. Id. at 1156.
45. Id. at 1128.
46. United States v. Greifelt, 5 L.R.T.W.C. 88, 253 (U.S. Military Trib. 1951). (The RuSHA
Case).
47. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity, 20 Dec. 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for
Germany, No. 3, Berlin, Jan. 31, 1946, pp. 50-55.
48. Poland v. Greiser, 13 L.R.T.W.C. 70 (Supreme Nat'l. Trib. of Poland 1948). Poland v.
Goeth, 7 L.R.T.W.C. 4 (Supreme Nat'l. Trib. of Poland 1946).
49. Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950,2 LSI 115 (lsr.).
50. Id.
51. CrimA 40/61 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, [1961] IsrSC 36 277.
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concerned acts that occurred prior to the entry into force of the Genocide
Convention. Indeed, most of the punishable acts took place even before the
word genocide had been invented. These cases are therefore all good
authority for the proposition that the crime existed prior to January 11,
1951. They do not, however, provide an adequate response to the question
whether the crime of genocide existed under international law prior to the
Second World War. There is no authority for prosecution for the crime of
genocide prior to the Nazi atrocities. This is a question that may never be
answered by a court of law, and one that is probably already entirely
theoretical. It is generally understood that criminal prosecution is confined
to living human beings who were above the age of criminal responsibility
when the acts took place, and who are physically and mentally fit to stand
trial. It seems unlikely that there will ever be prosecutions for the crime of
genocide with respect to acts that took place before the Second World War.
For the same reason, related or ancillary issues to the existence of the crime
of genocide, such as the absence of statutory limitation and the availability
of universal jurisdiction, may be relevant to acts perpetrated in recent
decades but are of no interest with respect to events that took place 90 years
ago.
Unless one adopts the view that the crime of genocide is based in
natural law and that it therefore existed from the beginning of human
society, it must be acknowledged that at some point in the past it cannot be
accurate to speak of the crime of genocide. In other words, despite the
preambular reference in the Genocide Convention to "all periods of
history," genocide became punishable under international law at some point
in time. Certainly, there can be no doubt that there are international crimes
subject to prosecution today that did not always exist, and that did not even
exist very long ago. The recently codified crime of enlistment or
recruitment of child soldiers is an example. There is some debate as to
when this phenomenon became an international crime,52 but the quarrel is
about a couple of decades rather than centuries or millennia. Nobody would
seriously contend that the crime of recruiting child soldiers, which is now
comprised within the Rome Statute, was always an international crime.
The entire phenomenon of international atrocity crimes53 can only be
dated to the early twentieth century. Indeed, the first formal recognition of
the concept was a response to the atrocities perpetrated against Armenians.
52. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E),
Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (May 31,
2004) (Robertson, J. dissenting).
53. This expression, which is used to refer to the genus of international crimes that includes
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and possible other crimes, has been devised by
David Scheffer. David J. Scheffer, The Future of Atrocity Law, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
399 (2002).
No. 2]
48 UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY (Vol. IV
On May 24, 1915, referring to the Armenian massacres, Russia, France and
Britain denounced "these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and
civilization. 54 The idea was developed further after the war ended. A
provision in the Treaty of S~vres contemplated international prosecution,
possibly by a League of Nations tribunal, "for the massacres committed
during the continuance of the state of war on territory which formed part of
the Turkish Empire on the 1st August, 1914."" 5 Obviously, the term
"genocide" was not used at the time; it had not been invented. But the acts
referred to are clearly analogous to the definition adopted later. Thus, there
is some authority for the existence of the "crime of genocide" as early as
August 1, 1914, although it is not as compelling in the absence of actual
prosecutions and convictions.
Before 1914, the trail goes even colder. Sometimes, reference is made
to the so-called "Martens clause" of the 1907 Hague Convention. It states:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the
High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases
not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants
and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of the public conscience. 6
However, despite this noble statement of humanitarian concerns, it is
clear from the context that the "Martens Clause" was meant to apply to the
parties' international armed conflict, in a context of reciprocity. What was
so radical about the declaration by Britain, France and Russia about the
Armenian massacres was its application to atrocities perpetrated by a
sovereign State against its own population. Moreover, perpetrators of such
violations could be held liable under international law.
In an article soon to be published, Professor Paul Boghossian of New
York University speaks to the retroactivity argument as follows:
How it is possible for a concept that was introduced in 1948 to
apply to events that occurred in 1915? The first thing to say about
this argument is that one can't in general assume that a concept can
apply to some event (or object) only if, at the time that the event
occurred (or the object existed), there were people around who
were prepared to apply that concept to it. For example, I can truly
say that there were dinosaurs on Earth 65 million years ago even
though 65 million years ago there was no one around who had the
54. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 35 (1948).
55. [1920] UKTS 11, Martens, Recueil g~ndral des trait6s, 99, 3e sdrie, 12, 1924, p. 720
(French version).
56. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) preamble, Oct. 18, 1907,2 U.S.T. 2269.
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concept dinosaur. "
He goes on to give the example of the tuberculosis bacillus, which
obviously existed and killed people before it was "discovered" in the early
nineteenth century. But this is merely another way of formulating the
proposition in the preamble of the Genocide Convention that "at all periods
of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity." The real
question is not whether genocide existed, but rather whether the crime of
genocide existed, which is a different matter altogether.
An international crime only exists when it is actively addressed by a
criminal justice system within an international legal framework. We have
no evidence of this taking place with respect to genocide or a crime
resembling genocide before August 1, 1914. Even then, there is no evidence
of prosecution until the 1940s. Thus, the conclusion seems warranted that
the international crime of genocide existed prior to the adoption of the
Convention, on December 9, 1948, and even prior to the adoption of
Resolution 96(I), on December 11, 1946. The evidence is fairly strong for
such "retroactive" existence of the crime during the Second World War, and
somewhat weaker for the period beginning with the outbreak of the First
World War. Before 1914, there is no real authority for the existence of a
crime of genocide, unless its source is believed to lie within natural law.
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
The objection that any recognition of a crime of genocide prior to the
entry into force of the Convention is contrary to the principle of legality,
pursuant to the maxim nullum crimen sine lege,58 is somewhat separate
from the question whether the crime actually existed before January 11,
1951. That the prosecutions took place and the convictions were registered
is authority for the existence of the crime. The fact that this may have been
retroactive criminal prosecution is a complaint about fairness, but it does
not imperil the claim that the crime existed. For example, there may be
jurisdictions that would refuse to prosecute genocide committed prior to a
certain date out of concern for the principle of legality. This is a
jurisdictional rather than a substantive matter. Nevertheless, it may be
useful here to address the retroactivity argument. The debates in the United
Nations General Assembly in 1946 confirm the importance of dealing with
this point, given that it seems to bolster some arguments about the
inexistence of the crime in a retroactive sense.
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal spoke to objections
57. Paul Boghossian, The Concept of Genocide, 12 J. GENOCIDE RESEARCH (forthcoming
2010).
58. Translated: "No crime without a law."
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concerning the principle of legality. The Nazi defendants had a good
argument that prosecution for crimes against peace violated the prohibition
of retroactive criminal law. According to the Nuremberg judgment, "it is to
be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of
sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice."59 The French version of
the judgment is even more qualified: "[N]ullum crimen sine lege ne limite
pas la souverainet des Etats; elle ne formule qu 'une rkgle g~niralement
suivie." The judgment continues:
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties
and assurances have attacked neighboring states without warning is
obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know
that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish
him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go
unpunished... [The Nazi leaders] must have known that they were
acting in defiance of all international law when in complete
deliberation they carried out their designs of invasion and
aggression.60
With respect to war crimes, the Tribunal was able to point to some
precedent, including the Hague Conventions.61However, for crimes against
humanity, which is the cognate of the crime of genocide, the Tribunal
produced no real authority, nor did it even seriously try to demonstrate that
such acts had been punishable under international law in the past.62 Perhaps,
although the Tribunal never seems to have said so clearly, it favored the
same logic with respect to crimes against humanity as with crimes against
peace. Thus, with respect to the atrocities and persecutions contemplated by
the notion of crimes against humanity, the Nazis "must have known that
they were acting in defiance of all international law." This was the approach
taken a few years later in one of the successor trials, Alstitter, referred to
above.63
There are contending theories to defend the apparent retroactivity
of the Nuremberg prosecution of crimes against humanity. One
relies upon such instruments as General Assembly 95(I) of
December 1946, confirming the Nuremberg principles as evidence
that the London Charter and the judgment of the International
Military Tribunal were declaratory of international law.' The other
concedes the point that crimes against humanity constituted new
law, but holds this to be acceptable because the Nazi crimes could
59. Goering, 13 I.L.R. at 462.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 497.
62. Id. at 498.
63. See supra note 42.
64. G.A. Res. 96 (1) U.N. Doc. A/3 10 (Dec. 11, 1946).
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not go unpunished. A proponent of the latter hypothesis, Hans
Kelsen, wrote:Since the internationally illegal acts for which the
London Agreement established individual criminal responsibility
were certainly also morally most objectionable, and the persons
who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral
character, the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be
considered as absolutely incompatible with justice. Justice required
the punishment of these men, in spite of the fact that under positive
law they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts
made punishable with retroactive force. In case two postulates of
justice are in conflict with each other, the higher one prevails; and
to punish those who were morally responsible for the international
crime of the Second World War may certainly be considered as
more important than to comply with the rather relative rule against
ex post facto laws, open to so many exceptions.65
Along similar lines, the Dutch judge at the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East ("Tokyo Tribunal"), B.V.A. R61ing, said of the principle
nullum crimen sine lege that:
[T]his maxim is not a principle of justice but a rule of policy, valid
only if expressly adopted, so as to protect citizens against
arbitrariness of course (Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege), as
well as against arbitrariness of legislations (Nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine praevia lege). Nor does this rule consider whether a
certain act was criminally wrong at the moment it was committed,
but only the question as to whether that act was or was not
forbidden under penalty. As such, the prohibition of ex post facto
law is an expression of political wisdom, not necessary applicable
in present international relations. This maxim of liberty may, if
circumstances necessitate it, be disregarded even by powers
victorious in a war fought for freedom. It is, however, neither the
task nor within the power of the Tribunal to Judge the wisdom of a
certain policy.66
These remarks were echoed years later, by the District Court of Jerusalem,
in Eichmann:
It is indeed difficult to find a more convincing instance of just
retroactive legislation than the legislation providing for the
punishment of war criminals and criminals against humanity and
65. Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a Precedent in
International Law? 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW QUARTERLY 153, 165 (1947) (For an endorsement of
Kelsen's approach, see the reasons of Justice Peter Cory in R. v. Finta, (1994) 1 SCR 701, 874
(Can.)).
66. DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, CHARTER,
INDICTMENT AND JUDGMENTS 700 (Neil Boister and Robert Cryer, eds., 2008).
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against the Jewish People, and all the reasons justifying the
Nuremberg judgments justify eo ipse the retroactive legislation of
the Israel legislator. We have already referred to the decisive
ground of the existence of a "criminal intent" (mens rea), and this
ground recurs in all the Nuremberg judgments. The Accused in this
case is charged with the implementation of the plan for the "Final
Solution of the Jewish Question." Can anyone in his right mind
doubt the absolute criminality of such acts?67
The International Military Tribunal is not without its critics, of course.
At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judge Pal of India
objected strenuously on the retroactivity issue, and in the result, voted to
acquit (although his concerns were with crimes against peace, not crimes
against humanity).68 Along similar lines, Kenneth S. Gallant has written
recently that the statement of the Nuremberg Tribunal "has a cynical ring to
it. It implies that judges can and should ignore principles of justice in
service of the sovereign powers that created their court."69 Yet examination
of contemporary case law suggests that the Nuremberg approach has stood
the test of time.
The relativism of Nuremberg with respect to retroactive crimes gave
way to a more positivist view with the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948 (only hours after the
Genocide Convention had been approved by the General Assembly).
Article 11(2) of the Universal Declaration states:
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.
Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was
applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.y
The prosecution of crimes against humanity (and genocide) is thus
acceptable to the extent that they were recognized as crimes under "national
or international law" at the time of their perpetration. Nuremberg is
compatible with this norm if the first theory is adopted, but apparently not
the second.
Concern about the fate of the Nuremberg precedent weighed heavily on
States engaged in the process of transforming the rather laconic provisions
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights into treaties. Two drafting
67. A.G. Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (District Court Jerusalem 1968).
68. See supra note 66at 811-930.
69. KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2009).
70. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 71. U.N. Doc. G.A.O.R., 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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projects were underway in the months following the adoption of the
Declaration: the European Convention on Human Rights and the Covenant
on Human Rights. The European Convention moved more quickly to
completion, and was concluded in November 1950. The Covenant took
much longer, being split into two instruments along the way. Only the first,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966, is
relevant to this essay.
In 1949 and 1950, the Western European states that prepared the
European Convention of Human Rights chose to incorporate Article 11(2)
of the Universal Declaration-it became Article 7(1) of the Convention-
but added a paragraph, Article 7(2), so as to much more explicitly shelter
the Nuremberg jurisprudence from challenges based upon the principle of
legality: "This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was
criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."'7' According to a Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights, in a July 2008 judgment:
The preparatory works to the Convention show that the purpose of
paragraph 2 of Article 7 is to specify that Article 7 does not affect
laws which, in the wholly exceptional circumstances at the end of
the Second World War, were passed in order to punish war crimes,
treason and collaboration with the enemy; accordingly, it does not
in any way aim to pass legal or moral judgment on those laws.72
Similarly, the drafters of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights adopted a slightly different provision than article 7(2) of the
European Convention, but one that is of similar effect and that was driven
by the same considerations: "Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial
and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time
when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of
law recognized by the community of nations. ' 73 Thus, two of the major
human rights instruments reflect a large degree of deference toward the
approach of the Nuremberg Tribunal, even though it probably did not,
strictly speaking, faithfully respect the nullum crimen principle.
The European Court has often seemed inspired by the same flexible
approach adopted by the International Military Tribunal and endorsed by
71. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 7, § 2,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
72. Kononov v. Latvia, (no. 36376/04), Judgment, 24 July 2008, para. 115(b), citing, X. v.
Belgium, (no 268/57), [1960] Yearbook 241; Touvier v. France, no. 29420/95, (1997) 88 DR 148;
Papon v. France (no. 2) (dec.), no. 54210/00, ECHR 2001-XII (extracts).
73. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15, § 2, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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Hans Kelsen and B.V.A. Roling. It has adopted two tests: (1) the law must
be "foreseeable" and (2) it must be "accessible. " It need not be written
down. In practice, at least in certain cases, this test has quite a resemblance
to the Nuremberg view by which the Nazi defendants "knew what they
were doing was wrong." Two cases from the United Kingdom dealing not
with international crimes but with the ordinary crime of "spousal rape"
provide important authority here.74 This concept had not traditionally been
part of the common law, which defined the crime of rape as an act
perpetrated by a man against a woman "other than his wife." In the 1980s,
common law judges in England started to find defendants guilty of raping
their wives. The convicted men petitioned the European Court of Human
Rights, arguing that the law had been changed without them being properly
informed. The Court dismissed the applications, saying the criminal
prohibition of rape, even with respect to a spouse, was both foreseeable and
accessible. The Court was persuaded in its opinion by the fact that the crime
in question was offensive to "human dignity and human freedom."75 In
other words, it might well have applied the non-retroactivity rule more
strictly had the case concerned a more technical or administrative offence
that did not engage core values of human dignity and freedom.
The liberal approach to nullum crimen taken by the European Court has
quite evidently inspired judges at the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals. In one of the more detailed treatments of this issue, in
Hadihasanovi6, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia was asked to declare that the concept of superior
responsibility as a mode of liability amounted to retroactive law. It turned to
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, noting that Article 7
of the Convention "allows for the 'gradual clarification' of the rules of
criminal liability through judicial interpretation. 76 It said that it was "not
necessary that the elements of an offence are defined, but rather that general
description of the prohibited conduct be provided,"77 citing in support
several rulings of the European Court, including one of the spousal rape
decisions, which it quoted in extenso.7" Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone relied upon this passage in its
discussion of nullum crimen in the child soldier case.79
A year after the Hadiihasanovi6 jurisdiction motion, the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
74. C.R. v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 363 (ser. A.) at 41 (1996).
75. Id.
76. Prosecutor v. Hadiihasanovid., Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to
Jurisdiction, T 58 (Nov. 12, 2002).
77. Id.
78. S.W. v. United Kingdom, Ser. A, No. 335-B, para. 36.
79. Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (May 31, 2004).
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invoked the words of the International Military Tribunal to the effect that
nullum crimen was "first and foremost a 'principle of justice.'" 8 Also citing
the spousal rape cases of the European Court, the Appeals Chamber said:
This fundamental principle 'does not prevent a court from
interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime'. Nor
does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the
court. But it does prevent a court from creating new law or from
interpreting existing law beyond the reasonable limits of acceptable
clarification. This Tribunal must therefore be satisfied that the
crime or the form of liability with which an accused is charged was
sufficiently foreseeable and that the law providing for such liability
must be sufficiently accessible at the relevant time, taking into
account the specificity of international law when making that
assessment.8
The Appeals Chamber referred again to the European Court's position that
the concepts of "foreseeability" and "accessibility" of a norm will greatly
depend on "the content of the instrument in issue, the field it is designed to
cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed."82 On the
specificity of international criminal law, the Court returned to Nuremberg
and the words of the United States Military Commission in the Alstitter
case, explaining the difficulties of applying the ex post facto rule to such
prosecutions.83
As noted earlier, even if it is valid, the nullum crimen objection does
not undermine the conclusion that the crime of genocide existed prior to
January 11, 1951. But in any event, the authorities tend towards a rejection
of the nullum crimen argument. Perhaps the nullum crimen was thinner in
the 1940s, and it is thicker today. But case law of the European Court of
Human Rights and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia echoes the philosophy of the judges at Nuremberg, at least to
the extent that the prosecutions concern crimes that strike at human dignity.
But, as has also been noted above, this issue is all rather theoretical, given
the virtual impossibility of criminal trials for acts perpetrated prior to the
Second World War.
80. Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoijub Ojdanid's
Motion Challenging Jurisdiction-Joint Criminal Enterprise, 1 37 (May 21, 2003).
81. Id. 38.
82. Id. T 39 (citing Groppera Radio AG v. Switzerland, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 321, 68, (1990)).
83. Id. United States v. Alstotter, 3 T.W.C. 954, 963 (U.S. Military Trib. 1951).
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"CIVIL" CONSEQUENCES WITH RESPECT TO PAST
GENOCIDE
Even if there can be no realistic prosecution for genocide with respect
to acts perpetrated in 1915, because of human longevity, can there be civil
consequences if it is acknowledged that the crime of genocide was indeed
committed at the time? Alfred de Zayas has argued that the general law of
state responsibility may be applicable, noting the uncontroversial point that
"it is a principle of international law, and even a general conception of law,
that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation."84 But this is a trifle simplistic; even a lay person would be
aware of the enormous number of violations of international law committed
in recent history that have never brought with them an "obligation to make
reparation." There are huge legal obstacles, especially the farther back we
go in time. In addition to demonstrating the violation of international law
itself, it is above all essential to establish a jurisdiction where the dispute
might be heard. Identifying the parties to such litigation is not
straightforward either.
Much of De Zayas's argument seems predicated upon the idea that
genocide by Turkey against Armenians is ongoing, with the consequence
that the issue of statutory limitation is inapplicable. The examples of such
continuing manifestations of genocide are destruction of property and of
"historical memory." This certainly cannot be genocide within the meaning
of the definition set out in the Convention, because destruction of property
and of "historical memory" are not punishable acts of genocide listed in
Article 2. A plain reading of Article 2 makes it clear that the list of
genocidal acts is an exhaustive one, and there is much authority to confirm
this, should a literal reading of the text be deemed insufficient.
Of course, it is possible to adopt a broader view of the definition of
genocide, one that would encompass such acts. However, the general
tendency of international case law has been relatively conservative in this
respect. Attempts to introduce "cultural genocide," or the related concept of
"ethnic cleansing," have been generally unsuccessful. In Bosnia v. Serbia,
the International Court of Justice adopted the views of a Trial Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia that, even in
customary law, "despite recent developments, genocide was limited to
physical or biological destruction of a group."85 Accordingly, the Court
concluded "that the destruction of historical, religious and cultural heritage
cannot be considered to be a genocidal act within the meaning of Article II
84. Factory at Chorz6w (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.1.J. (ser. A), No. 17, at 20 (Sept. 13).
85. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 20 (Feb. 26).
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of the Genocide Convention. "86 Nevertheless, the Court endorsed a
statement by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia that "where there is physical or biological
destruction there are often simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious
property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may
legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the
group.
87
One of the difficulties with the civil dimension is identifying the
victims; few remain alive. Dr. de Zayas invokes various recent human
rights declarations, such as the United Nations Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, to support the right of
"the immediate family, dependants or other persons or groups of persons
closely connected with the direct victims. '8 8 This might plausibly extend to
the second or third generation, but there is no judicial authority to support
such a conclusion. The Armenians are not the only group with historic
claims. There are also campaigns for restitution or compensation related to
the slave trade, colonialism and the subjugation of indigenous peoples, for
example. To date, none have been particularly successful in establishing
their entitlements before international or national judicial bodies. Future
success cannot be ruled out, and many bright legal minds are trying to find
the magic bullet that can make such grievances justiciable. But it is
unhelpful to suggest that recourse of this nature has a serious prospect of
success.
In recent years, there has been some fairly successful adjudication of
claims related to the Holocaust. However, they do not necessarily provide
very helpful precedent for other grievances. The payment of reparations by
Germany in the aftermath of the war was made out of a sense of
responsibility but was in no sense a result of a legal claim against an
unwilling defendant. More recently, the litigation has been directed towards
private bodies for the restitution of artwork, bank accounts and similar
assets.89 Of course, to the extent this may also exist with respect to the
Armenian atrocities in 1915, the door may be open. But it seems difficult to
contend that any principle of state responsibility has been established and
that a case can be directed against Turkey itself.
Recourse before the International Court of Justice does not seem
realistic for the reasons discussed above, relative to the non-retroactivity of
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Alfired de Zayas, The Genocide Against the Armenians 1915-1923 and the Relevance of
the 1948 Genocide Convention, (2004), http://alfreddezayas.com/Lawhistory/armlegopi.shtml.
89. MICHAEL R. MARRUS, SOME MEASURE OF JUSTICE, THE HOLOCAUST ERA RESTITUTION
CAMPAIGN OF THE 1990S 4, 36-39 (2009).
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the Genocide Convention. Both Armenia and Turkey are parties of the
Genocide Convention and neither has made a reservation to Article 9,
which gives jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice. Neither side
seems to have shown any inclination to test the point by taking a claim
before the Court, an indication in itself that this remedy is probably rather
remote. Nevertheless, if a case were taken, and in the remote possibility that
the International Court of Justice would acknowledge a retroactive scope to
the Convention, an order for reparation cannot be excluded.
The General Assembly or the Security Council could also seek an
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. But it seems
improbable that such an option would be followed if neither of the parties
seeks such judicial resolution of the dispute. Other states could hardly be
expected to invite one or the other bodies of the United Nations to apply for
an advisory opinion, absent the consent of at least one or other of the
concerned states.
CONCLUSION
The statements of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
referred to in the introduction to this essay, are clearly erroneous. Geoffrey
Robertson describes this as "a dubious attempt to blind Parliament with
bogus legal science."" Both General Assembly Resolution 96(I) and the
Genocide Convention itself recognize that genocide has taken place at all
times in human history. There have been prosecutions for the crime dealing
with acts perpetrated even before the word was invented.
Although the hypothesis of retroactive operation of the Genocide
Convention should not be totally dismissed, the prevailing view would
seem to make this an unlikely scenario. The argument is only of any real
interest to the extent that either Turkey or Armenia might choose to litigate
issues concerning the Convention before the International Court of Justice.
Neither has shown any inclination to do so. Otherwise, there is no available
forum.
There is very good authority for the proposition that genocide was a
punishable crime under international law before the adoption of Resolution
96(I) and even before 1944, when the word itself was coined. There is an
arguable case that the crime of genocide existed even before the Second
World War, and as far back as 1914, although the authority becomes less
and less solid the further back one goes. Certainly, there have been no
prosecutions for pre-Second World War events. In any case, the issue is
rather theoretical: because of the lapse of time, there are no known suspects
alive who can be traced to acts perpetrated in 1915.
90. ROBERTSON, supra note 5, at 115.
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This leaves the possibility of remedies for some kind of civil
compensation. But here too, the chance of any real progress is very
unlikely. If the goal is to obtain financial reparation, in whatever form, the
authorities at present are not very favorable to the Armenian cause. It is not
impossible that this might change in the future, although only if there is a
dramatic adjustment in terms of broader principles in a manner that would
apply to many historic crimes and atrocities.
On the other hand, if the debate is essentially about an
acknowledgement of the atrocities for the purpose of the historical record,
perhaps accompanied by an apology, there is no good reason why the term
"genocide" cannot be used to describe the events of 1915. If this is the case,
conceding that the Genocide Convention itself, and the customary legal
obligations associated with its content, are not properly applicable may
actually assist the process. Legal opinions that overstate the law may play
well in certain Armenian communities, but they have negative
consequences to the extent that they frighten Turkey about the
consequences of any admission. In fact, the debate about the proper
description of the events of 1915 is only made more complicated to the
extent that it is haunted by the suggestion that it brings with it legal
entitlements which may have substantial financial consequences. Greater
realism on both sides of the debate would be helpful. There can quite
obviously be no criminal prosecution simply because of the passage of
time. Nor, for the reasons outlined above, does there appear to be any
serious prospect of a successful legal remedy that would bring with it
something resembling compensation or reparation. The word "genocide"
becomes easier to use if it is dissociated from the implication that the
Convention itself may apply retroactively.
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